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SUBSIDIARY STRATEGY OF EMERGING MARKET MULTINATIONALS: 
A HOME COUNTRY INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE  
 
Abstract 
We examine the effects of home country institutional factors, namely, home 
country government support, domestic institutional weaknesses, and state ownership 
on the subsidiary-level strategy of global integration (I) and local responsiveness (R) 
of emerging market multinational enterprises (EMNEs). We draw upon the home 
country institution-based view and the I/R framework to develop our theoretical model. 
We empirically test our hypotheses using an original new survey data collected from 
Chinese multinational subsidiary managers supplemented with parent-level and 
country-level data. We find that home country government support and domestic 
institutional weaknesses have significant and negative effects on global integration 
strategy of Chinese multinational subsidiaries. On the other hand, domestic institutional 
weaknesses push foreign subsidiaries to pursue local responsiveness strategy. 
Nevertheless, those with greater degree of state ownership in their parent firms are 
neither willing to disintegrate from their parent firms nor motivated to pursue local 
responsiveness strategy in order to deal with home country institutional deficiencies 
and develop new sources of competitiveness in foreign markets. Our findings have 
advanced the literature on subsidiary strategy in the context of EMNEs, and provide 
important implications for subsidiary managers and policy makers. 
 
Key words: subsidiary strategy; global integration; local responsiveness; Chinese 
multinational subsidiaries. 
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SUBSIDIARY STRATEGY OF EMERGING MARKET MULTINATIONALS: 
A HOME COUNTRY INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
1. Introduction 
The majority of previous studies on emerging market multinational enterprises 
(EMNEs) focus on parent-centric decisions in outward foreign direct investment 
(OFDI), such as choices of establishment modes, ownership structure, and host country 
locations (e.g., Cui & Jiang, 2012; Hong, Wang, & Kafouros, 2015; Lu, Liu, Wright, 
& Filatotchev, 2014; Meyer, Ding, Li, & Zhang, 2014). Yet, little is known about 
EMNEs’ subsidiary strategies, which reflect a notable research gap. We aim to address 
this limitation in our study. 
Subsidiary strategy suggests some level of choice or self-determination on the 
part of the subsidiary (Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998; Birkinshaw & Pedersen, 2009). The 
underlying premise of subsidiary strategy is that decisions are made by subsidiary 
managers in their marketplace, not by headquarters (HQs) managers (Garcia-Pont, 
Canales, & Noboa, 2009; Rugman & Verbeke, 2001; Rugman, Verbeke, & Nguyen, 
2011).  
Birkinshaw & Pedersen (2009) argue that a distinction needs to be made 
between the concepts of subsidiary role and subsidiary strategy. A subsidiary role is 
assigned to it by the parent firm, and the subsidiary is simply to follow orders. 
Subsidiary strategy involves the decision-making power and entrepreneurship of the 
subsidiary in its value-adding activities independently from the parent firm and other 
subsidiaries (Garcia-Pont et al., 2009; Nguyen & Rugman, 2015a, 2015b).  
Much of our knowledge on subsidiary strategy comes from research in the 
context of advanced economy MNEs (Birkinshaw, 1995, 1996; Birkinshaw & 
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Morrison, 1995; Mauri & Phatak, 2001; Nguyen & Rugman, 2015a, 2015b). The 
literature documents the diversity of subsidiaries driven by their specific strategic roles, 
the importance of external embeddedness in host country environments, and internal 
embeddedness within MNEs (Andersson, Forsgren, & Holm, 2002; Hoenen & 
Kostova, 2014; Meyer, Mudambi, & Narula, 2011). Furthermore, highly-developed 
institutions allow MNEs from advanced economies to build and accumulate firm-
specific advantages (FSAs), especially managerial skills, integration systems of 
organizing, and coordinating and orchestrating activities of a spatially dispersed 
network of foreign subsidiaries (Kostova & Roth 2002; Wang, Luo, Lu, Sun, & 
Maksimov, 2014). 
In contrast, EMNEs are latecomers in the world stage, originating from complex 
and weak domestic institutional environments (Luo & Tung, 2007; Luo, Xue, & Han, 
2010; Pan, Teng, Supapol, Lu, Huang, & Wang, 2014). Home country institutions are 
a source of advantages and disadvantages for EMNEs (Rugman, Nguyen, & Wei, 
2014). On the one hand, home country government support and state ownership provide 
EMNEs necessary resources to embark on internationalization (Lu et al., 2014; Wang, 
Hong, & Kafouros, & Wright, 2012). On the other hand, domestic institutional 
weaknesses create disadvantages for EMNEs’ foreign subsidiaries due to the liabilities 
of origin, which emerge as a direct consequence of the national origins of EMNEs 
(Bartlett & Ghoshal, 2000; Ramachandra & Pant, 2010).  
The liabilities of origin can affect EMNEs and their foreign subsidiaries through 
a variety of processes, such as organizational imprinting and identity, image, capability 
development and resource scarcity (Ramachandra & Pant, 2010). Because EMNEs’ 
foreign subsidiaries are associated with the weak institutional heritage in home 
countries, their corporate images and legitimacy in host countries are unfavorable (Luo 
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& Tung, 2007; Madhok & Keyhani, 2012; Wang et al., 2014). Furthermore, weak 
domestic institutions have impeded EMNEs to develop traditional Western-type FSAs 
in technology, global brands, and managerial expertise (Hennart, 2012; Rugman, 2010; 
Wei, 2010). These create additional costs and challenges of doing business abroad for 
EMENs’ foreign subsidiaries. 
In this study, we argue that subsidiary strategies play an important role for 
EMNEs, in which home country institutions are critical factors influencing the strategic 
behaviors of EMNEs’ foreign subsidiaries. We elaborate on the home country 
institution-based view and the global integration and local responsiveness (I/R) 
framework in developing our conceptual model and hypotheses. The central idea of the 
I/R framework is that on the one hand, the MNE exploits the benefits of economies of 
scale and scope across national borders and must balance the need to be responsive to 
preferences and tastes of local consumers and governments’ regulations on the other 
hand (Bartlett & Ghosbal, 1989; Prahalad & Doz, 1987).  This strategy is called 
“transnational solution” by Bartlett & Ghoshal (1989). 
Our study addresses a key research question “to what extent do home country 
institutions (i.e. home country government support, domestic institutional weaknesses, 
and state ownership) affect the IR strategies of EMNEs’ subsidiaries after they enter 
foreign markets?” We deem that the foreign subsidiaries of Chinese MNEs are a 
particularly interesting research context. The surge of Chinese OFDI has been largely 
attributed to China’s “go global” policy and home country government’s direct 
involvement in the allocation of firms’ resources, which in turn affect their 
internationalization behavior (Buckley, Clegg, Cross, Liu, Voss, & Zheng, 2007; Luo 
et al., 2010; Wang et al., 2012).  
Furthermore, institutional variations in China affect subsidiary strategies of 
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Chinese MNEs through various mechanisms. These include the characteristics of parent 
firms, such as the degree of state ownership, and government affiliation and political 
connections (Cui & Jiang, 2012; Duanmu, 2014; Liang, Ren, & Sun, 2015; Pan et al., 
2014; Wang et al., 2012); regional locations in China (Hong et al., 2015); the nature of 
FDI projects, such as the level of compliance with government FDI policies (Lu et al., 
2014; Hong et al., 2015), and the home-host political relations (Chen & Young, 2010; 
Duanmu, 2014).  
We make three new contributions to the literature. First, we advance the extant 
literature on EMNEs with a specific focus on EMNEs’ subsidiary strategies. We obtain 
subsidiary managers’ insights through a survey with Chinese multinational subsidiaries 
for our empirical tests. We also supplement our primary survey data with secondary 
data from multiple sources, including parent-level data from company annual reports, 
and country-level data from public sources. Thus, our theoretical and empirical 
approach differs from Wang et al., (2014) which examines parent-centric decision-
makings and autonomy delegation to foreign subsidiaries as an enabling mechanism for 
EMNEs; however, they use data from a survey with HQs executives of Chinese parent 
firms.  
Second, our work advances the literature of subsidiary strategies because many 
of the previous studies only focus on how multinational subsidiaries adapt to host 
country institutional environments (Kostova & Roth 2002; Luo, 2001, 2003). Given 
that EMNEs originate from unique and complex institutional environments, we 
explicitly delineate their foreign subsidiaries’ strategies as responses to home country 
government support, domestic institutional weaknesses, and state ownership. 
Furthermore, our analysis on the influence of state ownership on subsidiary strategies 
is a new and interesting contribution, because this phenomenon has been largely 
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neglected in the existing literature. Our study provides insights into the role of state 
ownership in enforcing EMNEs’ competitiveness or aggravating their disadvantages in 
international markets.  
Third, we extend the I/R framework by analyzing it in the context of EMNEs’ 
subsidiaries. While the I/R framework emphasizes the dual achievement of global 
integration and local adaptation for advanced economy MNEs, it might be challenging 
for EMNEs due to their lack of managerial skills in coordinating and managing a 
geographically dispersed network of foreign subsidiaries (Fan, Nyland, & Zhu, 2008; 
Morck, Yeung, & Zhao, 2008; Rugman & Li, 2007). Our study is among the first few 
attempts which investigate how EMNEs’ subsidiaries balance integration and 
responsiveness as responses to domestic institutional advantages and disadvantages. 
Accordingly, we broaden the theoretical knowledge of the I/R framework by examining 
its implications on EMNEs.  
 
2. Theoretical background  
2.1. Subsidiary strategy of global integration and local responsiveness  
Global integration is driven by economies of scale and scope, cost reduction, 
and resource intensity, in which MNEs standardize their production and distribution of 
homogenous products and services on a worldwide basis. In contrast, local 
responsiveness is the ability of MNEs to understand local market variations in 
consumer tastes, and demands in segmented markets, and to respond to different 
national standards and regulations imposed by autonomous governments and agencies 
(Bartlett & Ghosbal, 1989; Prahalad & Doz, 1987).  
On the one hand, subsidiaries pursue global integration strategy by relying on 
parent-firm FSAs developed in home countries, which are internationally transferred at 
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low cost and without substantial adaptation in host countries (Rugman & Verbeke, 
1992, 2001; Rugman, 2002; Rugman & Verbeke, 2008). Global integration is 
consistent with the view that parent firms’ FSAs are critical resources in overcoming 
the liabilities of foreignness, i.e. additional costs and risks of doing business abroad 
(Rugman, 2002; Rugman & Verbeke, 2008).  
On the other hand, subsidiary strategy literature emphasizes that FSAs can be 
developed by both parent firms and by foreign subsidiaries (Nguyen & Rugman, 2015a, 
2015b; Rugman & Verbeke, 2001; Rugman et al., 2011). Subsidiary initiatives defined 
as discrete and proactive undertaking of the subsidiary advances are new ways for the 
MNE to use or expand its resources (Birkinshaw, 1996, 1997; Birkinshaw & Hood, 
1998). Foreign subsidiaries access complementary resources in host countries and 
create new knowledge, and develop new learning and innovative capabilities, which 
enable them to reap the benefits of local responsiveness as their local embeddedness 
increases (Cantwell & Mudambi, 2005; Nguyen & Rugman, 2015a, 2015b).  
It will be interesting to examine this phenomenon in the context of EMNEs 
because they lack the traditional knowledge-based FSAs which can be exploited abroad 
(Peng, 2012; Ramamurti, 2009, 2012; Wang et al., 2014). In other words, compared 
with MNEs from advanced economies, subsidiaries of EMNEs rely less on their parent 
firms’ FSAs. Therefore, foreign subsidiaries play critically important roles in 
generating new strategic assets, in establishing local legitimacy and reputation, and in 
catching up with global competitors.  
 
2.2. Home country institutions and subsidiary strategy   
Home country institutions create advantages and disadvantages for EMNEs and 
their foreign subsidiaries. First, resources and capabilities of EMNEs are based on home 
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country-specific advantages (CSAs) (Buckley et al., 2007; Rugman & Nguyen, 2014; 
Rugman et al., 2014; Rugman, Nguyen & Wei, 2016). Home country government 
support (a type of home CSAs) enables EMNEs to embark on internationalization and 
influences their strategic decisions (Duanmu, 2014; Hong et al., 2015; Wang et al., 
2012). On the one hand, government support and assistance may alleviate EMNEs’ 
competitive disadvantages by providing favorable policies, investment information, 
and low-cost capital (Lu, Liu, & Wang, 2011; Luo et al., 2010). On the other hand, such 
institutional incentives toward OFDI may affect EMNE subsidiary managers’ 
perceptions toward resource availability and their capabilities to take risks in foreign 
markets (Lu et al., 2014; Pan et al., 2014). 
Second, EMNEs’ foreign subsidiaries suffer from the liabilities of origin as a 
direct consequence of weak domestic institutions (Madhok & Keyhani, 2012; Wang et 
al., 2014). Institutional constraints in emerging economies include both institutional 
voids (i.e. an absence of intermediaries and regulatory systems which facilitate a well-
functioning market, such as a lack of effective intellectual property rights protection, 
poor law enforcement, and underdeveloped factor markets) (Boisot & Meyer, 2008; 
Khanna & Palepu, 2010) and political hazards (i.e. corruption, moral degradation, 
ambiguous laws, government intervention, and informal competition) (Ramachandran 
& Pant, 2010; Witt & Lewin, 2007).  
The liabilities of origin of EMNEs’ foreign subsidiaries in host countries refer 
to the negative institutional heritage associated with poor corporate governance, 
negative credibility, a lack of accountability and transparency of EMNEs perceived by 
different stakeholders (Luo & Tung, 2007; Wang et al., 2014). The liabilities of origin 
are different from the liabilities of foreignness, which refers to geographical, 
psychological, and cultural distance between home and host countries (Madhok & 
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Keyhani, 2012).  
Firms may overcome the liabilities of foreignness through global integration 
strategy, in which their subsidiaries rely on parent firms’ FSAs in order to compete with 
local competitors and other global giants in foreign markets (Rugman & Verbeke, 1992, 
2001). Such a strategy best explains market-seeking OFDI in which foreign subsidiaries 
focus on exploiting parent firm’s existing FSA bundles to achieve economies of scale 
and scope (Ramamurti, 2012). In contrast, firms need to pursue a local responsiveness 
strategy in order to overcome the liabilities of origin, which are originated from weak 
domestic institutions which impede firm resource development at parent-level. Foreign 
subsidiaries develop and/or acquire new FSAs by accessing host CSAs, which may 
explain strategic asset-seeking OFDI.  It is important for EMNEs’ foreign subsidiaries 
to disassociate from their parent firms and to take initiatives in building local legitimacy 
in host economies (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Wang et al., 2014; Xu & Shenkar, 2002). 
EMNEs’ foreign investments driven by strategic asset-seeking have been 
widely recognized in the current literature. EMNEs use their subsidiaries as a 
“springboard” to develop linkage, leverage, and learning (LLL) of new capabilities in 
host countries, and to acquire strategic resources, especially through cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As) (Cui & Jiang, 2012; Luo & Tung, 2007; Ramamurti, 
2012). Overall, the strategies of EMNEs’ foreign subsidiaries in response to home 
country institutions reflect the complex parent-subsidiary relationships. 
 
3. Hypotheses development 
3.1. Home country government support and the global integration and local 
responsiveness strategy of the subsidiary 
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One important precondition for global integration strategy is that an MNE needs 
to possess FSAs which can be exploited by their subsidiaries in foreign markets 
(Rugman, 2002; Rugman & Verbeke, 2003). However, EMNEs are different from 
Western MNEs because they derive their competitiveness from home CSAs rather than 
FSAs (Buckley, Clegg, Cross, & Voss, 2010; Deng, 2009; Rugman & Li, 2007; 
Rugman et al., 2016). Home country government support (a type of home CSAs) 
includes direct assistance in the form of preferential credit, low-interest bank loans and 
subsidies, host country information, guidance on direction of OFDI, administrative 
assistance, and post-investment supervision (Luo et al., 2010; Morck et al., 2008).  
First, home country government support downplays the role and importance of 
existing FSAs as stimulus for MNEs to engage in OFDI. It is one particularly important 
instrument for EMNEs in their internationalization through establishing foreign 
subsidiaries (Hong et al., 2015; Nayyar, 2008; Wang et al., 2012). While EMNEs lack 
knowledge-based FSAs, home country government support reduces foreign 
subsidiaries’ reliance on parent-firm FSAs in offsetting costs associated with the 
liabilities of foreignness and in competing with local firms (Buckley et al., 2010; Luo 
& Tung, 2007; Peng, 2012).  
Second, with the access to home country government support and low-cost 
capital, EMNEs can achieve strategic-asset seeking OFDI by purchasing available 
assets through M&As (Deng, 2009; Luo et al., 2010; Wei, 2010). Acquisitions of 
foreign brand and local technology enable EMNEs to overcome the liabilities of origin 
so that they can compete with advanced economy MNEs (Madhok & Keyhani, 2012). 
Purchases of local firms’ resources help EMNEs’ foreign subsidiaries to reduce reliance 
on the HQs’ FSAs and become less integrated with parent firms. In essence, EMNEs’ 
foreign subsidiaries use home country government support and assistance as an 
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alternative solution to overcome their parent firms’ competitive disadvantages. Thus, 
we predict that:  
Hypothesis 1a: An EMNE’s foreign subsidiary, whose parent firm receives greater 
home country government support towards OFDI, will be characterized by lower 
global integration strategy. 
 
Foreign subsidiaries need to develop and/or to acquire new FSAs and adapt their 
operations to local environments to gain the benefits of local responsiveness (Bartlett 
& Ghosbal, 1989; Prahalad & Doz, 1987; Rugman & Verbeke, 1992, 2001). Moreover, 
local responsiveness strategy emphasizes the combination of new FSAs creation with 
host CSAs (Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998; Meyer et al., 2011; Nguyen & Rugman, 2015a, 
2015b). However, such combination is very difficult to achieve, since host country 
resource endowments are monopolized by local firms and are not freely accessible 
(Hennart, 2009, 2012; Rugman et al., 2014). Previous studies show that EMNEs’ 
foreign subsidiaries generally fail to tap into host CSAs and to respond to local 
environments, due to their limited internationalization experience, weak strategic 
planning, and ineffective relationships with host country stakeholders (Fan et al., 2008; 
Fan & Zhu, 2014; Luo & Tung, 2007; Wang et al., 2014).  
Home country government support provides EMNEs (especially those firms 
from China) with extra resources, which may pave the way for them to take risks abroad 
(Buckley et al., 2010; Luo & Tung, 2007). This reduces subsidiary managers’ 
perceptions on competitive disadvantages of their parent firms, and enables them to 
overcome uncertainties associated with local responsiveness strategy in foreign 
markets. In other words, home country government support may help subsidiary 
managers feel more confident in pursuing local responsiveness strategy and in adapting 
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to local business requirements (Lu et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2012). Therefore, we 
predict that:  
Hypothesis 1b: An EMNE’s foreign subsidiary, whose parent firm receives greater 
home country government support towards OFDI, will be characterized by greater 
local responsiveness strategy. 
 
3.2. Moderating effects of state ownership on the relationship between home country 
government support and the global integration and local responsiveness strategy of the 
subsidiary  
We argue that the effects of home country government support on the global 
integration strategy of the subsidiary are contingent upon the degree of state ownership 
of the parent firm for two key reasons. First, state-owned enterprises (SOEs), especially 
in the case of Chinese SOEs, have privileged access to valuable government-controlled 
resources, such as cheap financing, low tax rates, and public R&D, which are not 
available to other types of companies (Deng, 2009; Hong et al., 2015; Morck et al., 
2008; OECD, 2008; Xu & Zhang, 2008). Since 2000, Chinese government has actively 
supported the globalization of SOEs as they are “national champions” (Liang et al., 
2015). In contrast, it was not until 2003 that private enterprises in China were formally 
allowed to invest abroad with a very limited scale (Alon, 2010; Wei, 2010). 
Consequently, foreign subsidiaries of Chinese SOEs tend to perceive government 
support as a type of FSAs embedded in their parent firms, which are closely related to 
the state-ownership nature and tightly intertwined with home country institutions 
(home CSAs).  
Second, Chinese SOEs are more likely to perceive government support as signal 
of political control and intervention, given that the government is the company owner 
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(Duanmu, 2014; Shi, Markoczy, & Stan, 2014).  They are required to fulfill national 
objectives in their internationalization, such as securing energy supply and enhancing 
domestic firms’ innovation capabilities (Duanmu, 2014; Globerman & Shapiro, 2009; 
Wang et al., 2012). Thus, the global integration strategy assures that foreign 
subsidiaries’ activities are directed towards achieving the main objectives of the HQs 
(Chang & Taylor, 1999; Thite, Wilkinson, & Shah, 2012). In other words, foreign 
subsidiaries are deeply embedded in the internal networks, in which parent firms 
maintain high degree of control in foreign operations and implement centralized 
organizational structure (Harzing, 2000; Westney & Zaheer, 2009). Taken our 
theoretical arguments altogether, we predict that 
Hypothesis 2a: The negative effect of home country government support on the global 
integration strategy of an EMNE’s subsidiary is weakened with greater state ownership 
of the parent firm.  
 
The degree of state ownership moderates the effect of home country 
government support on the local responsiveness strategy of EMNEs’ subsidiaries. First, 
Chinese SOEs are often viewed as extremely inefficient and ineffective in converting 
home country government support into proprietary FSAs and in achieving superior 
financial performance results (Chen & Tan, 2013; Cornett, Guo, Khaksari, & Tehranian, 
2010). Although they have greater access to government resources than firms without 
state ownership, Chinese SOEs’ return on assets (ROA) are about half of their non-state 
counterparts and the debt-to-equity ratio is 1.6 compared to 0.8 for private firms (The 
Economist, 2014, 2015). The poor performance of SOEs is due to pressures to achieve 
political goals beyond economic rationalities, government intervention, and a lack of 
transparency in business practices (Buckley, 2014; Chen & Tan, 2013; Delios, Zhou, 
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& Xu, 2008). Consequently, home country government support is less effective in 
helping foreign subsidiaries of SOEs to attain local adaptation and build local 
legitimacy in foreign markets.  
Second, state ownership increases the liabilities of origin of EMNEs’ foreign 
subsidiaries, because they are associated with a negative image of bureaucratic and 
inefficient operations relative to private and foreign enterprises (Meyer et al., 2014; 
OECD, 2009). State ownership may raise skepticism and hostility against EMENs’ 
foreign subsidiaries, which are viewed as agents to implement political and economic 
ambitions of their home country governments (Rugman et al., 2014). Accordingly, their 
foreign subsidiaries may encounter greater uncertainties in accessing complementary 
resources in host countries and in achieving local responsiveness strategy (Cui & Jiang, 
2012; Morck et al., 2008; Rugman et al., 2014). Hence, the effect of home country 
government support in facilitating subsidiaries’ local responsiveness strategy is likely 
less significant for EMNEs with greater state ownership. Thus we predict that:  
Hypothesis 2b: The positive effect of home country government support on the local 
responsiveness strategy of an EMNE’s subsidiary is weakened with greater state 
ownership of the parent firm.  
 
3.3. Domestic institutional weaknesses and the global integration and local 
responsiveness strategy of the subsidiary 
Competitive disadvantages of EMNEs originate from their domestic 
institutional weaknesses, which impede EMNEs to develop FSAs in their home 
countries (Khanna & Palepu, 2010; Luo & Wang, 2012). Formal institutional voids, 
such as weak intellectual property rights and ineffective legal frameworks, discourage 
firms to invest in R&D, develop technological capabilities, and build global brands 
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(Luo & Tung, 2007; Nolan, 2005). Informal institutional hazards, such as corruption, 
moral degradation, government intervention, and local protectionism impede firms to 
develop managerial capabilities and improve corporate governance practices (Boisot & 
Meyer, 2008; Wang et al., 2014).  
Domestic institutional weaknesses push EMNEs to invest in more efficient and 
transparent institutional environments, where they can concentrate on generating new 
knowledge and developing their competitive advantages (Wei, 2010; Witt & Lewin 
2007). In other words, EMNEs’ foreign subsidiaries may become less integrated with 
parent-level resources and the HQs’ organizational culture which is deeply rooted in 
home country institutional deficiencies. Therefore, we suggest that:  
Hypothesis 3a: An EMNE’s foreign subsidiary, which perceives greater domestic 
institutional weaknesses, will be characterized by lower global integration strategy. 
 
Because of domestic institutional weaknesses, EMNE parent firms are unable 
to build global reputation and develop advanced technology. In order to compensate for 
competitive disadvantages and survive in foreign markets, EMNEs’ foreign 
subsidiaries need to develop new strategic resources and build their own reputation and 
legitimacy in local operations (Luo & Tung, 2007; Wang et al., 2014).  
Domestic institutional weaknesses also have psychological consequences for 
EMNEs’ subsidiary managers in the form of either self-doubt or unawareness of the 
firms’ true potential in international competition and shift their emphasis on foreign 
operations (Bartlett & Ghosbal, 2000). Foreign subsidiaries need to develop FSAs 
through local adaptation as they are impelled to increase credibility within EMNEs 
(Deng, 2009; Rui & Yip, 2008; Wang et al., 2014). Hiring managers from host countries 
enable EMNEs’ foreign subsidiaries to build local credibility and distance themselves 
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from the unfavorable image of their parent firms (Bartlett & Ghosbal, 2000; Wang et 
al., 2014). Therefore, we predict that:  
Hypothesis 3b: An EMNE’s foreign subsidiary, which perceives greater domestic 
institutional weaknesses, will be characterized by greater local responsiveness strategy. 
 
3.4. Moderating effects of state ownership on the relationship between domestic 
institutional weaknesses and the global integration and local responsiveness strategy 
of the subsidiary 
On the one hand, state ownership might compensate for the negative effects of 
domestic institutional weakness because SOEs can achieve market power based on the 
access to government resources and the benefits of preferential treatment (Boisot & 
Meyer, 2008; Luo et al., 2010; Meyer et al., 2014). For example, Chinese SOEs often 
have in-house research institutes and government-funded R&D investments because 
they are considered as major actors in the national innovation system (OECD, 2008; 
Xu & Zhang, 2008). This may offset their foreign subsidiaries’ perceptions toward 
competitive disadvantages resulting from inefficient domestic R&D systems and weak 
intellectual property protection rights.  
On the other hand, domestic institutional hazards may not be a matter of 
concerns for state-owned EMNEs due to their inherent organizational culture and 
corporate governance. For example, Chinese SOEs often sacrifice economic goals in 
favor of interests of the state. They are controlled by multiple levels of government 
authorities, which result in a lack of accountability and transparency. Thus, agency 
problems are particularly profound in Chinese SOEs (Chen & Young, 2010; Globerman 
& Shapiro, 2009; Liu & Tylecote, 2009). This is a type of administrative heritage of 
 18 
Chinese SOEs. Consequently, foreign subsidiaries of state-owned EMNEs do not 
perceive institutional hazards really a big problem. Thus, we hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 4a: The negative effect of domestic institutional weaknesses on the global 
integration strategy of an EMNE’s foreign subsidiary is weakened with greater state 
ownership of the parent firm.  
 
Domestic institutional weaknesses push foreign subsidiaries to access host 
CSAs in developing new resources through local responsiveness strategy. This will 
assure their survival and growth in the intensified competition with local firms and 
other global giants in foreign markets. In other words, local responsiveness strategy is 
assumed to be mainly driven by the economic considerations of performance and profit 
maximization.  
However, Chinese SOEs’ foreign subsidiaries often carry out the ultimate goals 
of home country government in achieving a broader scope of national-level objectives 
(Globerman & Shapiro, 2009; Pan et al., 2014). The political purposes of Chinese OFDI 
often outweigh the economic purposes (Buckley et al., 2007; Cuervo-Cazurra, Inkpen, 
Musacchio, & Ramaswamy, 2014; Duanmu, 2014). Furthermore, Chinese SOEs are 
not under pressure of dividend payments to their majority shareholders–the state, and 
threats of bankruptcy for poor financial performance (Chen & Young, 2010; Globerman 
& Shapiro, 2009; Luo et al., 2010; Zhang & Freestone, 2013). Therefore, they are less 
motivated to improve their competitive disadvantages and to catch up with global 
competitors.  
The above discussion suggests that SOEs and their foreign subsidiaries tend to 
downplay the importance of economic objectives in their internationalization and thus 
make less effort to compensate for domestic institutional weaknesses by taking 
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initiatives and creating new FSAs through local responsiveness strategy. Thus, we 
predict that:  
Hypothesis 4b: The positive effect of domestic institutional weaknesses on the local 
responsiveness strategy of an EMNE’s foreign subsidiary is weakened with greater 
state ownership of the parent firm.  
 
The direct effects of home country government support and domestic 
institutional weaknesses, and the moderating effects of state ownership on global 
integration and local responsiveness of Chinese multinational subsidiaries are depicted 
in Figure 1.  
Insert Figure 1 here 
 
4. Methodology 
4.1. Research context, data sources, sample and questionnaire design  
We test our hypotheses using a self-constructed dataset of foreign subsidiaries 
of the top 500 Chinese manufacturing firms, published by the China Enterprise 
Confederation and China Enterprise Directors Association. We only focus on 
manufacturing Chinese firms since service OFDI still accounts for only a small fraction 
of China’s total OFDI (Wang et al., 2014). We compiled a list of Chinese multinational 
subsidiaries from multiple sources. These included firms’ annual reports, 
announcements on the establishment of new subsidiaries, stock market documents (e.g., 
prospectuses, share issues, and various announcements), websites of Chinese firms and 
their foreign subsidiaries. We had a total population of 633 foreign subsidiaries, which 
belong to 144 Chinese manufacturing MNEs investing in 78 countries from 1991 to 
2010.  
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We carefully designed our questionnaire survey which was based on 
international business (IB) theories. We self-designed questions of home country 
government support and domestic institutional weaknesses because these two variables 
are new in the literature of EMNEs and their subsidiaries. They were grounded in the 
home country institution-based view and prior research on Chinese OFDI (Deng, 2009; 
Luo & Tung, 2007; Luo et al., 2010; Morck et al., 2008; Wei, 2010). Other questions 
were adapted from previous empirical studies on subsidiary strategies (Bartlett & 
Ghoshal, 1989; Kim & Hwang, 1992; Luo, 2001). We had our survey instrument 
reviewed by several accomplished profound senior scholars in the field of IB, especially 
those conducting research on subsidiary strategy and management.  
We pre-tested our questionnaires by telephone interviews with eight 
subsidiaries, which belong to three Chinese MNEs located in Zhejiang province and 
they are included in our final sample. These subsidiary managers provided useful 
feedback and suggestions and we revised our questionnaire accordingly. These include 
(1) statements in each question should be shorter and simpler; (2) plain language should 
be used instead of academic terminologies; (3) questions for several variables which 
were adopted from the literature were revised to avoid confusion. These careful 
procedures assured that our questionnaire was easy to understand and to respond. The 
specific questions used in this study are presented in Table 1 with detailed assessment 
of construct reliability and construct validity. 
Insert Table 1 here 
Our unit of analysis was Chinese multinational subsidiaries and the most 
desirable informants were subsidiary managers. According to our pre-test interviews, 
subsidiary managers who were closely involved in the process of establishment of 
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foreign subsidiaries were familiar with home country institutions.  To ensure the 
reliability of our survey data, we targeted the following informants:  
1) the respondent was a member of the top management team (i.e. either a managing 
director or a general manager).  
2) the investment project was completed by 2010. 
3) the respondent has been involved in the establishment process of the subsidiary. 
We manually collected information on subsidiary management team and the 
contact information from multiple sources. These include information in annual reports, 
websites of parent firms and foreign subsidiaries, business news, professional networks 
such as LinkedIn, and other public sources. We approached subsidiary managers by e-
mails to invite them to participate in the survey. We also sent our questionnaires to 
subsidiary managers by post when we could not find their email address information. 
We collected data over a period of seven months from September 2011 to March 2012.  
We contacted all 633 subsidiaries. After two rounds of invitation and five rounds of 
friendly reminders, we received 124 complete and valid responses. Our survey achieved 
a response rate of 19.6 percent, comparable favourably to that of previous studies 
focusing on subsidiary managers (e.g., Harzing, 2002: 20.0 percent; Luo, 1999: 19.2 
percent; Nguyen & Rugman, 2015a, 2015b: 20 percent). 
The sample size is sufficient for our empirical tests for two reasons. First, 
according to Bartlett, Kotrlik, & Higgins (2001), a sample size of 124 respondents is 
enough for a total population of 633 foreign subsidiaries required for continuous data. 
Second, the ratio of observations to independent variables should not fall below five 
for multiple regression analysis in order to ensure the results are not too specific to the 
sample (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010). Therefore, the sample is statistically 
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sufficient given that there are eleven variables (including control variables) in this 
study.   
Table 2 presents the data characteristics of our sample subsidiaries and their 
parent firms. The 124 participating subsidiaries belong to 118 Chinese parent firms. In 
terms of entry modes, 65 percent of sample subsidiaries are established by greenfields 
and 35 percent by acquisitions. In terms of ownership, 59 percent are wholly owned 
foreign subsidiaries (WFOEs) and 41 percent are joint ventures (JVs). Subsidiaries of 
state-owned parent firms account for 41 percent and of non-state owned parent firms 
for 59 percent. In terms of geographic dispersion, 62 percent of these subsidiaries are 
located in developed countries (25 percent in the United States, 19 percent in Europe, 
6 percent in Oceania and 12 percent in other regions), and 38 percent of the sample 
subsidiaries are established in developing countries (27 percent in Asia, 8 percent in 
Africa and 3 percent in others).  
Insert Table 2 here 
 
4.2. Non-response bias test  
To estimate the likelihood of a non-response bias, we compared data 
characteristics of respondents and non-respondents, which we collected these data from 
parent firms’ annual reports. We used the chi-square test for categorical variables and 
the t-test for continuous variables. The results show that there are no differences 
between the respondents and non-respondents at a 5 percent significance level, in terms 
of equity ownership (WFOE versus JV: x2=3.42, p=.18), establishment modes 
(greenfield versus acquisition: x2=0.14, p=.71), host country (developing versus 
developed: x2=0.02, p=.90), the degree of state ownership (t=0.88, p=.38), and 
investment size (t=-0.62, p=.54).  
 23 
Meanwhile, we used a time trend extrapolation test following Armstrong & 
Overton (1977) who argue that late respondents tend to represent non-respondents. We 
compare the above characteristics between early respondents and late respondents. The 
early respondents included all those who filled in the 
questionnaire promptly after they had received our e-mails from the first two rounds of 
invitations, whereas the late-respondent group consisted of those who responded 
following the last two rounds of reminders. There are no significant differences 
between early and late respondent groups with the above characteristics.  
Since the decision to response or not response our questionnaire was made by 
individual informants, so the final sample is a self-selected and not a random sample. 
Therefore, we applied the Heckman correction procedure (Heckman, 1979) with a two-
step statistical approach to check if there is a selection bias. This approach has been 
used by other studies checking the non-response bias (Lepak, Takeuchi & Snell, 2003; 
Pérez-Nordtvedt, Babakus & Kedia, 2010). Baruch & Holtom (2008) argue that 
individuals are more likely to respond to questionnaire if they are from a low power 
distance country and receive questionnaire through email (compared to traditional 
mail). We introduced these two new variables that influence whether an informant 
responded to our questionnaire in the Heckman selection equation, since all the other 
variables (equity ownership, establishment modes, state ownership, host country 
development and investment size) are included in the initial model for integration and 
local responsiveness. We find that the value for the calculated inverse Mills ratio (IMR) 
is not statistically significant. We report and discuss the hypothesis results in Section 5 
by including IMR as one control variable. We also compare the results for independent 
variables and moderating effects with the results generated without the inclusion of 
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IMR, and the values remain the same. Therefore, we conclude that non-response bias 
is not a serious problem in this study. 
 
4.3. Common method variance 
The best strategy to avoid potential common method variance is to collect 
information for dependent and independent variables from different sources (Chang, 
Witteloostuijn, & Eden 2010). In addition to the survey data, we constructed one 
independent variable (state ownership) and several control variables (subsidiary size, 
establishment mode, equity ownership, and host country development) by using 
information from parent firms’ annual reports and country-level public data source 
(World Bank country classification). The parent firms are publicly listed and are 
required to disclose information and data.  
In addition, we also implemented a number of ex-ante and ex-post procedures 
suggested by Chang et al., (2010) and Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff (2003). 
First, in the ex-ante procedures, we assured respondents of complete confidentiality. 
We used multi-item constructs, and scale items of interest were spread throughout the 
questionnaire. Furthermore, the survey asked a broad range of issues on Chinese OFDI, 
which went beyond this study’s focus. Dependent and independent variables appeared 
in different parts of the questionnaire, which created a psychological separation for the 
respondents (Podsakoff et al., 2003).  
Second, in the ex-post procedures, we specified a complex model that includes 
moderating effects, since such complicated relationships are not a part of the 
respondents’ theory-in-use (Chang et al., 2010). Moreover, we applied the statistical 
remedy, which includes Harman’s one-factor test (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). A 
principle component analysis showed that the largest factor explains only 18.4 percent 
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of the total variance in the analysis. Thus, our results are not subject to a common 
method bias in the survey responses. 
 
4.4. Variable measurements 
4.4.1. Dependent variables 
The scale used for the dependent variables in the survey is provided in Table 1.  Global 
integration emphasizes the support and resource sharing between parent MNEs and 
their foreign subsidiaries (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Kobrin, 1991; Mauri & Phatak, 
2001). We use the construct developed by Kim & Hwang (1992), in which a 
subsidiary’s global integration is measured by subsidiary managers’ perceptions toward 
sharing with Chinese parent firms’ resources in seven areas after foreign entry. We use 
a 7-point Likert scale (1=not at all to 7=very much).  
We follow Luo (2001), in which the construct of local responsiveness is 
measured as subsidiary managers’ perceptions towards responses to local customer 
needs, government policies, market conditions, and rivalries using a 7-point Likert scale 
(1=not at all to 7=very much).  
 
4.4.2. Independent variables  
Respondents evaluate home country government support during subsidiary 
establishment on a 7-point Likert scale (1=not at all to 7=very much), in terms of 
financial support, the gathering of intelligence data and information, privileged access 
to domestic resources, and risk-safeguard mechanisms.  
Domestic institutional weaknesses is measured by subsidiary managers’ 
perceptions toward OFDI as the strategy to escape from China’s institutional 
deficiencies using a 7-point Likert scale (1=not at all to 7=very much). This includes 
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imperfect capital markets, weak intellectual property rights and legal frameworks, and 
decentralization of economic and political administration.     
 We measured the nature of state ownership in Chinese parent firms by the 
percentage of equity ownership by the Chinese government and its agencies. This 
measurement has been widely used by previous studies (Cui & Jiang, 2012; Wang et 
al., 2012). Our data is sourced from parent firms’ annual reports. 
 
4.4.3. Control variables 
We control for subsidiary size, which is measured by the ratio of financial 
investment of the subsidiary to the parent firm’s total global assets (Brouthers & 
Brouthers, 2000; Slangen & Hennart, 2008). Data is sourced from parent firms’ annual 
reports. 
Subsidiary’s establishment mode is a dummy variable with acquisitions coded 
as “1” and greenfields coded as “0”. Data is sourced from parent firms’ annual reports. 
A newly established subsidiary is more likely to adopt the strategy of global integration, 
while an acquired subsidiary is inclined to take a locally responsiveness strategy 
(Harzing, 2000, 2002; Slangen & Hennart, 2007).  
Equity ownership is measured by using the dummy variable “1” for WFOSs 
with more than 95% equity controlled by Chinese parent firms, and “0” for JVs. Data 
is sourced from parent firms’ annual reports. 
Competition leads to a high level of local responsiveness by requiring 
subsidiaries to focus on product differentiation specific to local environment, and 
maintain good relationships with local stakeholders (Luo, 2001). Respondents self-
assess local competition in host markets with respect to existing rivals and new entrants 
based on a 7-point Likert scale (1=not at all to 7=very much).  
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Demand heterogeneity makes it more difficult and less efficient to globally 
leverage resources and manage dispersed international operations (Doz & Prahalad, 
1991). In contrast, differences in demands across host countries require a high degree 
of product differentiation and local adaption (Luo, 2001; Roth & Morrison, 1990). 
Demand heterogeneity is measured by a pair of questions concerning diversity and 
segmentation with a 7-point Likert scale (1=not at all to 7=very much) (Luo, 2001). 
We controlled for host country economic development by following 
classification of the World Bank. We use a dummy variable with developed country 
coded as “1” and developing country coded as “0”. Finally, we control for the potential 
effect of different manufacturing sectors on subsidiary strategy by using primary metal 
as the baseline industry.  
 
4.5. Reliability and validity of construct assessment   
We assess the reliability of six multi-item constructs with Cronbach’s alpha. A 
value of 0.70 is the cut-off point of a satisfactory internal consistency (Field, 2009; Hair 
et al., 2010). As shown in Table 1, Cronbach’s alpha ranges from 0.767 to 0.856, 
indicating that the scale items of our constructs are reliable.  
We evaluate construct validity by examining convergent and discriminant 
validity. The confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) model provides a good overall fit of 
the data (Chi-square=346.458; CMIN/DF=2.203; NFI=0.930; CFI=0.974; 
RMSEA=0.072). As shown in Table 1, all individual items load strongly, which are 
much greater than the recommended value of 0.50 and they are statistically significant 
(Fornell & Larcker, 1981; Hair et al., 2010). This indicates that they converge on a 
common underlying construct.  
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We also assess six constructs for discriminant validity by calculating the square 
root of the average variance extracted (AVE) (see Table 1). The value of the square 
root of AVE estimates for each construct is significantly greater than any correlation 
among pairs of constructs. Therefore, the constructs demonstrate adequate discriminant 
validity (Fornell & Larcker, 1981).  
 
5. Results  
5.1. Hypotheses tests and results  
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of all variables and their correlations.  
Insert Table 3 here 
All correlations between pairs of independent variables are lower than 0.3, 
which is below the threshold of 0.5 (Hair et al., 2010). The analysis for Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF) and Tolerance shows that the largest VIF value is 1.942 and the 
lowest Tolerance Value is 0.705. Hence, there is no sign of multicollinearity in our 
dataset. Furthermore, we make all interaction terms to be mean-centred to avoid 
potential multicollinearity problems (Cui & Jiang, 2012; Wang et al., 2012).  
We test our hypotheses using ordinary least square (OLS) estimates (by having 
the IMR as one control variable). We use two separate sets of models (each including 
control variables, independent variables, and the moderator) to test hypotheses for 
global integration and local responsiveness, as reported in Table 4 and Table 5 
respectively. We analyze four models for each dependent variable and the F-statistics 
indicates that all of them are significant.  
As shown in Table 4, Model 1 includes control variables and state ownership. 
Three of the control variables (establishment mode, equity ownership and demand 
heterogeneity) are significant. State ownership of Chinese parent firms is positively and 
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significantly associated with subsidiaries’ global integration strategy (p<0.05). 
Insert Table 4 here 
Model 2 includes two independent variables. The result (p<0.01) supports 
Hypothesis 1a, which indicates that Chinese multinational subsidiaries perceive home 
country government support as a source of compensation for their lack of traditional 
Western-type FSAs, so that they can overcome the liabilities of foreignness by 
integrating less with their parent firms. The results illustrate that Hypothesis 3a is 
supported (p<0.05) indicating the greater the domestic institutional imperfections 
perceived by subsidiary managers, the weaker the global integration strategy will be.  
In Model 3, Hypothesis 2a is not supported since the moderating effect of state 
ownership on the relationship between government support and global integration is 
insignificant. The results support Hypothesis 4a (p<0.05), which suggests that 
subsidiaries of Chinese MNEs with greater degree of state ownership are not willing to 
overcome domestic institutional deficiencies by disintegrating from their parent firms. 
However, the global integration strategy in the case of Chinese SOEs is purely driven 
by political orientations, especially in accessing government resources and maintaining 
consistency with political objectives (Deng, 2009; Luo & Tung, 2007; Wang et al., 
2012). These types of advantages associated with state ownership are deeply rooted in 
China’s institutions, which are difficult to be transferred internationally (Rugman et al., 
2016). Finally, the results are robust in Model 4 (full model), which includes all 
independent variables and moderating effects. The adjusted R2 value (0.344) for the full 
model is higher than the other models.  
Table 5 provides the regression results for local responsiveness strategy. Three 
control variables in the baseline Model 1 are significant (establishment mode, demand 
heterogeneity, and host country economic development). Meanwhile, subsidiaries of 
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Chinese MNEs with higher state ownership are not actively responsive to local 
conditions (p<0.01). In Model 2, no significant relationship is observed between 
government support and subsidiary strategy of local responsiveness. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 1b is not supported. In contrast, domestic institutional weaknesses push 
foreign subsidiaries to pursue local responsiveness strategy (p<0.001). Therefore 
Hypothesis 3b is supported.  
Insert Table 5 here 
In Model 3 with moderating effects, Hypothesis 2b is not supported, as the 
coefficient estimate is insignificant. In contrast, Hypothesis 4b is supported as state 
ownership negatively moderates the impact of domestic institutional weaknesses on the 
subsidiary strategy of local responsiveness (p<0.05). This is undesirable because 
Chinese SOEs face even greater liabilities of origin due to their bureaucratic nature, 
weak corporate governance and poor operating efficiency (Chen & Young, 2010; 
Globerman & Shapiro, 2009). However, their foreign subsidiaries are not motivated to 
pursue local responsiveness strategy as responses to domestic institutional deficiencies 
due to rigidity coming from the direct consequence of state ownership nature. 
Additionally, Model 4 which includes all variables shows unchanged results and 
improves explanatory power.  
Figure 2 illustrates the moderating effects of state ownership. 
Insert Figure 2 here 
 
5.2. Robustness tests 
We perform robustness tests and validate our results with resampling 
techniques, which are powerful tools for estimating standard errors in small samples. 
These include bootstrap standard errors and statistical tests from the average of the 
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statistics from the bootstrap samples. We also split the dataset into two random sample 
groups and compare the results, which are consistent (Efron, 1983).  
To address endogeneity concerns, we conduct a Hausman test by comparing the 
OLS estimates with two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates. We use region-specific 
marketization developed by Fan, Wang, & Zhu (2006) as the instrumental variable (IV) 
for domestic institutional weaknesses, since uncertainties and transaction cost 
associated with weak institution and government interruption tend to be lower in 
regions with a higher level of marketization (Luk, Yau, Sin, Tse, Chow, & Lee, 2008). 
We identify the encouraged OFDI industries (Hong et al., 2015) and government 
financial grant toward Chinese parents as appropriate IVs for government support in 
OFDI. A valid IV should be correlated with the independent variables, but uncorrelated 
with the error term (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). We conduct the over-identifying 
restrictions test and perform a regression of the IV residuals. The results of 2SLS 
estimation are consistent with those of OLS analysis, showing that endogeneity is not 
a concern in the key variables. Due to space constraints, our 2SLS results are not 
reported.  
 
6. Discussion and conclusion  
6.1. Theoretical contributions  
This study enhances our understanding of the I/R framework in the context of 
EMNEs’ foreign subsidiaries. Bartlett & Ghoshal (1989) use case studies of nine MNEs 
from advanced economies (the United States, Europe, and Japan) to develop the 
transnational solution, in which an MNE maintains high integration and resource 
coordination within MNE network, and requires subsidiaries simultaneously to actively 
response to local business environments and customer preferences. Transnational 
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solution is perceived as the highest strategic solution since it is built upon multiple 
sources of competitive advantages, including parent-firm FSAs developed in home 
countries and subsidiary-generated FSAs through accessing host CSAs (Rugman & 
Verbeke, 1992, 2001, 2003; Rugman et al., 2011; Rugman & Nguyen, 2014).  
However, we find that home country institutions of EMNEs do not stimulate 
foreign subsidiaries to achieve twin goals of global integration and local responsiveness 
simultaneously. This may raise concerns about EMNEs’ internationalization strategies. 
First, subsidiaries tend to disintegrate with their parent firms due to domestic 
institutional deficiencies and a lack of FSAs developed by EMNEs in home countries. 
In other words, subsidiary strategy of global integration is constrained by their home 
country institutions. It is important for emerging economies to improve domestic 
institutional environments, so that EMNEs are more confident to rely on home CSAs 
to develop core FSAs.  
Second, EMNEs’ foreign subsidiaries tend to adopt a multinational strategy 
(also known as multi-domestic strategy) with low global integration (Hypothesis 3a) 
and high local responsiveness (Hypothesis 3b) as a response to weak domestic 
institutions. In other words, the success of EMNEs’ foreign operations largely depend 
upon their subsidiaries taking initiatives to develop competitive advantages by 
accessing host CSAs and responding to local market requirements. However, given that 
host country resources are monopolized by local firms and are not freely accessible to 
foreign investors, local responsiveness is often difficult to achieve (Hennart, 2009, 
2012).  
It is prevalent for EMNEs to purchase global brands and advanced technology 
in order to overcome the liabilities of origin, enhance their reputation, and achieve local 
adaptation. However, the major challenge for EMNEs is that with a short period of 
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internationalization, they lack integration skills and systems, and international 
managerial expertise to integrate newly acquired assets and to coordinate worldwide 
activities (Peng, 2012; Rugman et al, 2016). One the one hand, government needs to 
devise support which helps EMNEs’ foreign subsidiaries to overcome uncertainties and 
risks associated with local responsiveness. On the other hand, given the insignificant 
relationship between government support and local responsiveness in this study, 
subsidiaries may need to take more initiatives in exploiting government support (a type 
of home CSAs) in realizing local adaption in host countries.  
 
6.2. Implications for practice 
Our study provides important implications for EMNE managers and policy 
makers. It is critical to recognize the importance of subsidiary strategies for EMNEs in 
overcoming their parent firms’ competitive disadvantages in international markets, and 
in contributing to the overall EMNEs’ long-term strategies to improve international 
competitiveness. Understanding the nature and the implications of home country 
institutional heritage for subsidiary strategies could prepare EMNEs’ subsidiary 
managers better for decisions on strategy and management of foreign businesses. The 
insights from our findings provide useful implications for policy makers, in which weak 
domestic institutions push EMNEs to depart from their parent firms by investing abroad. 
Meanwhile, government support and state ownership might enable EMNEs to embark 
on internationalization but such institutional incentives might not be of help for their 
subsidiaries’ strategies in foreign markets.  
6.3. Limitations and suggestions for future research directions 
Our study is subject to several limitations. First, we use a survey dataset with 
Chinese multinational subsidiaries, which may raise concern on the country-specific 
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nature of our findings. We suggest that future research could conduct a multiple-
country survey and compare and contrast the findings with our results. Second, 
subsidiary strategies are not static, but dynamic and evolving over time. However, our 
study is limited to the analysis from a cross-sectional data. It would be interesting to 
observe how foreign subsidiaries and parent firm EMNEs promote transnational 
solution over time. Lastly, the findings of our study are restricted to a set of the largest 
manufacturing MNEs. Future research can extend our work to other industries such as 
the service sector given that manufacturing OFDI often differs from services OFDI in 
terms of motives and local adaptation strategy (Brouthers & Brouthers, 2003). 
 
7. Conclusions  
Our study advances the EMNE literature, moving away from the parent-centric 
perspectives on internationalization. We confirm the importance of home country 
institutions in shaping subsidiary strategies of EMNEs. We find that it is difficult for 
EMNEs to pursue a transnational solution due to their lack of FSAs and the liabilities 
of origin they suffer because of their national origins from emerging economies. 
Domestic institutional weaknesses force EMNEs’ foreign subsidiaries to follow a 
multi-domestic strategy.  However, the nature of state ownership of parent firms make 
their foreign subsidiaries unwilling to disintegrate and unmotivated to take initiatives 
in developing new FSAs and in responding to local conditions in foreign markets 
accordingly. In conclusion, our study is among the first few attempts to look into an 
important research area. We hope that it will prompt future research towards a more 
systematic understanding of EMNEs’ subsidiary strategies.  
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Figure 1: Conceptual model  
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Figure 2: Moderating effects of state ownership: interaction effects of state ownership 
and domestic institutional weaknesses on (a) global integration and (b) local 
responsiveness 
(a) 
 
 
(b)  
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Table 1: Reliability and validity assessment  
Construct  Measurement on 7-point Likert scale  Factor  
loading  
Global integration  
(Cronbach’s 
alpha=0.811;  
AVE= 0.699) 
After foreign entry, to what extent your subsidiary shared parent 
firms’ resources with respect to:  
 
1. raw material and intermediate products   0.71 
2. manufacturing know-how 0.74 
3. R&D resources 0.82 
4. the use of brand names 0.75 
5. marketing know-how 0.73 
6. sales channels 0.81 
7. management expertise 0.84 
Local responsiveness  
(Cronbach’s 
alpha=0.856; 
AVE=0.812) 
After foreign entry, the subsidiary responded actively to local 
environment, and adopted different products and customer service et 
al. for each of the following factor 
 
1. local customer needs 0.85 
2. local government policies 0.89 
3. local market conditions 0.75 
4. local rivalry situation 0.81 
Home country 
government support 
(Cronbach’s 
alpha=0.804; 
AVE=0.586) 
At the time of entry, to what extent your subsidiary had Chinese 
government support when considering the following factors? 
 
1. financial support during investment 0.83 
2. information about investment opportunities, market analysis and 
host country environment  
0.79 
3. privileged access to domestic education markets and sources of 
scientific and technical research 
0.73 
4. government signed mutual investment agreements with host 
countries 
0.69 
5. government provides personal accident insurance  to expatriates 
working abroad 
0.70 
Domestic institutional 
weaknesses 
(Cronbach’s 
alpha=0.790; 
AVE=0.674) 
At the time of entry, to what extent was the decision to 
establish/acquire the subsidiary influenced by the following 
institutional factors in China? 
 
1. domestic imperfect capital market 0.71 
2. weak intellectual property rights and legal frameworks 0.80 
3. decentralization of the economic system and government 
administration 
0.75 
Competition 
(Cronbach’s 
alpha=0.834; 
AVE=0.642) 
1. At the time of entry, to what extent did you think the product 
market in which your company participates is competitive amongst 
existing rivals? 
0.76 
2. At the time of entry, to what extent did you think the product 
market in which your company participates was competitive 
amongst new entrants? 
0.72 
Demand heterogeneity 
(Cronbach’s 
alpha=0.767; 
AVE=0.592) 
 
1. At the time of entry, to what extent did you think the demand 
for your products within a host market is segmented according to 
region, income, gender, education, or other demographic attributes? 
0.78 
2. Following the above question, to what extent did you think the 
demand for your products within each segmented market is 
diverse? 
0.76 
Note: AVE: Average Variance Extracted 
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Table 2: Respondents’ characteristics 
 
 
 
 
 
Subsidiary (N=124; data in percentage)  
A. Entry strategy  B. Ownership 
Greenfield  64.52 Wholly-owned  58.87 
Acquisition  35.48 Joint venture  41.13 
 
C. State ownership  D. Investment size  
State owned  41.13 100 and above 7.1 
Non-state owned  58.87 50 ~ 100 9.0 
  1 ~ 10  42.6 
  1 and below 41.3 
 
E. Host countries:   
Developed countries 62.10 Developing countries 37.90 
(including):   (including):   
The United States  25.00 Asia  26.61 
Europe  18.55 Africa  8.06 
Oceania 6.45 Other  3.23 
Others  12.10   
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics and correlation (N=124) 
Variables   
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Mean 4.30 3.63 4.74 3.87 0.34 0.03 0.35 0.59 4.19 4.06 0.62 
S.D. 1.45 1.17 2.09 1.66 0.29 0.08 0.19 0.48 1.39 1.33 3.22 
1. Global integration  1           
2. Local responsiveness  -0.049 1          
3. Home country government support  -0.324 0.255 1         
4. Domestic institutional weaknesses -0.193 0.298 -0.091 1        
5. State ownership  0.053 -0.031 0.179 -0.219 1       
6. Subsidiary size  0.102 0.293 0.099 -0.133 0.148 1      
7. Establishment mode  -0.077 0.099 -0.064 0.103 0.063 0.129 1     
8. Equity ownership  0.055 -0.105 -0.031 -0.032 -0.036 0.012 -0.188 1    
9. Competition  0.109 0.036 0.025 0.003 -0.026 -0.176 -0.039 -0.049 1   
10. Demand heterogeneity  -0.214 0.152 0.042 0.026 -0.089 -0.061 -0.148 -0.070 0.133 1  
11. Host country economic development  -0.107 -0.218 0.015 0.187 -0.040 0.102 0.011 -0.125 0.050 0.061 1 
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Table 4: OLS regression results with the global integration as dependent variable 
Note: ***p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, ' p < 0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
(Constant) 2.653*** 
(0.562) 
3.167*** 
(0.668) 
2.702*** 
(0.565) 
3.340*** 
(0.676) 
Inverse mills ratio (IMR) 
 
0.036 
(0.003) 
0.040 
(0.003) 
0.040 
(0.003) 
0.042 
(0.003) 
Subsidiary size  1.657 
(1.434) 
1.565 
(1.447) 
1.565 
(1.438) 
1.443 
(1.445) 
Establishment mode  
 
-0.562' 
(0.294) 
-0.559' 
(0.074) 
-0.570' 
(0.055) 
-0.576' 
(0.0650 
Equity ownership 
 
1.127*** 
(0.271) 
1.111*** 
(0.275) 
1.109*** 
(0.272) 
1.081*** 
(0.275) 
Competition  0.065 
(0.080) 
0.062 
(0.080) 
0.056 
(0.080) 
0.051 
(0.080) 
Demand heterogeneity  -0.193* 
(0.084) 
-0.200* 
(0.084) 
-0.189* 
(0.084) 
-0.196* 
(0.084) 
Host country economic 
development  
-0.388 
(0.286) 
-0.337 
(0.290) 
-0.371 
(0.288) 
-0.307 
(0.292) 
State ownership 0.107* 0.108* 0.107* 0.109* 
 (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.073) 
H1a Home country government support -0.244** 
(0.131) 
 -0.288** 
(0.101) 
H3a Domestic institutional weaknesses -0.157*  -0.133* 
  (0.050)  (0.054) 
H2a Home country government support x state ownership  0.024 
(0.011) 
0.022 
(0.011) 
H4a Domestic institutional weaknesses x state ownership 0.173* 
(0.028) 
0.144* 
(0.035) 
     
N 124 124 124 124 
F-value  7.009*** 7.680*** 6.623*** 6.906*** 
R2 0.280 0.352 0.297 0.397 
Adjusted R2 0.240 0.301 0.261 0.344 
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Table 5: OLS regression results with the local responsiveness as dependent variable 
Variables  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
(Constant) 4.242*** 
(0.455) 
4.307*** 
(0.543) 
4.268*** 
(0.460) 
4.340*** 
(0.555) 
Inverse mills ratio (IMR) 
 
0.020 
(0.002) 
0.023 
(0.002) 
0.022 
(0.002) 
0.024 
(0.002) 
Subsidiary size  0.596 
(1.163) 
0.766 
(1.176) 
0.621 
(1.171) 
0.780 
(1.186) 
Establishment mode  0.104* 
(0.238) 
0.096* 
(0.252) 
0.106* 
(0.240) 
0.092* 
(0.254) 
Equity ownership  -0.388 
(0.220) 
-0.346 
(0.224) 
-0.392 
(0.221) 
-0.353 
(0.226) 
Competition  0.020 
(0.065) 
0.018 
(0.065) 
0.022 
(0.066) 
0.020 
(0.066) 
Demand heterogeneity  0.175* 
(0.068) 
0.180** 
(0.068) 
0.172* 
(0.068) 
0.170* 
(0.069) 
Host country economic 
development 
-0.362** 
(0.232) 
-0.398** 
(0.236) 
-0.381** 
(0.235) 
-0.413** 
(0.239) 
State ownership -0.203** 
(0.068) 
-0.194** 
(0.058) 
-0.223** 
(0.070) 
-0.186** 
(0.050) 
     
H1b Home country government support  
 
0.171 
(0.066) 
 0.158 
(0.053) 
H3b Domestic institutional weaknesses 0.323*** 
(0.088) 
 0.319*** 
(0.083) 
    
H2b Home country government support x state ownership 
 
-0.041 
(0.034) 
-0.045 
(0.030) 
H4b Domestic institutional weaknesses x state ownership 
 
-0.063* 
(0.028) 
-0.080* 
(0.045) 
     
N 124 124 124 124 
F-value  4.643 6.282 4.152 5.289 
R2 0.200 0.237 0.217 0.279 
Adjusted R2 0.159 0.175 0.167 0.214 
Note: ***p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, ' p < 0.1 
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